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Abstract 
In this paper we analyse the decision of firms in the Canadian manufacturing sector 
to co-operate on innovation projects. Our focus is on the motives behind this decision 
and the firm characteristics, both general and with respect to innovation activities, 
which influence the motives for innovation co-operation. Using data from the 
Canadian Survey of Innovation 2005 we find that the factors influencing the decision 
to co-operate in order to access external knowledge are very similar to those 
influencing cost-sharing motives. We also show that public funding leads firms to co-
operate in order to access external knowledge and R&D. 
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Non-technical summary 
“Yahoo!, eBay link up for online showdown” (The Gazette, 2006) and “Ebay talks to 
Microsoft, Yahoo about foe” (Wall Street Journal Europe, 2006) were the headlines 
that came along with the discussions about a possible co-operation between some of 
the major players in the internet and online search business. This is just one example 
of how important co-operation between firms has become in recent years. Co-
operations between firms and between firms and public research institutes have not 
been confined to marketing or sales alliances but have increasingly been targeted at 
R&D and innovation activities. Shorter product-life cycles, more complex 
technologies and increased possibilities for sharing knowledge and research results 
have all lead firms to look for partners for their R&D and innovation activities.  
Initiated by this increase in inter-firm co-operation, a large body of empirical and 
theoretical literature on firms’ motives to co-operate in R&D and innovation activities 
has developed. The motives firms have to conduct joint innovation activities are the 
starting point for this paper. We analyse how firms’ characteristics and measures of 
their innovation activities influence the underlying motives of their decision to 
cooperate in innovation. We use data from Statistic Canada’s Survey of Innovation in 
2005 to look at firm characteristics that lead firms to co-operate for one or the other 
reason. The survey includes a direct question on motives for innovation co-operation 
related to the development and the commercialization of product and process 
innovations. 
Our findings indicate that firms which co-operate in order to share the costs of 
developing innovative products and processes and those that get involved in 
innovation co-operation in order to access external knowledge are quite similar. They 
have R&D activities that are relatively more oriented towards basic than applied 
research, are large and more often belong to industries related to science. They also 
assign a high importance to strategic and formal protection methods. To put it simply, 
they are more research oriented than other firms. 
The firms that co-operate in order to scale up production and to commercialize 
innovations, respectively, are harder to describe. Both groups have in common that the 
innovation intensity has a positive effect after a certain threshold is reached, while the 
share of employees with university degrees and the share of employees involved in 
R&D activities do not. We find some evidence that public funding increases the flow 
of knowledge within the national system of innovation. Innovators are more likely to 
co-operate in order to get access to external R&D and expertise if they receive public 
funding than if they do not receive public funding. 
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1 Introduction 
“Yahoo!, eBay link up for online showdown” (The Gazette, 2006) and “Ebay 
talks to Microsoft, Yahoo about foe” (Wall Street Journal Europe, 2006) were the 
headlines that came along with the discussions about a possible co-operation 
between some of the major players or rather competitors in the internet and 
online search business. This is just one example of how important co-operation 
between firms has become in recent years. Co-operations between firms and 
between firms and public research institutes have not been confined to marketing 
or sales alliances but have increasingly been targeted at R&D and innovation 
activities. Shorter product-life cycles, more complex technologies and increased 
possibilities to share knowledge and research results have all lead firms to seek 
partners for their R&D and innovation activities. This upward trend in R&D 
partnerships has been documented among others by Hagedoorn (2002) and the 
OECD (OECD, 1986). 
Initiated by this increase in inter-firm co-operation, a large body of empirical 
and theoretical literature on firms’ motives to co-operate on R&D and innovation 
activities developed. A number of co-operation motives have been identified, like 
gaining access to (foreign) markets, sharing of costs and risk, the joint 
development of product and process innovations or access to complementary 
knowledge, to name a few. In recent years the role of knowledge in the 
innovation co-operation process has been extensively analysed empirically using 
data from the Community Innovation Surveys. It has been shown that gaining 
access to knowledge held by institutions and firms outside a firm’s own 
boundary and controlling knowledge outflows to the public domain 
(“internalizing spillovers”) is one of the main reasons why firms and institutions 
co-operate on innovation activities of various kinds. 
The motives firms have to conduct joined innovation activities, is the starting 
point for this paper. Statistic Canada’s Survey of Innovation in 2005 includes a 
direct question on the co-operation motives of firms1. The survey includes both, 
motives related to the development and motives related to the commercialization 
of product and process innovations. Thus – contrary to other studies – we will not 
have to construct proxy measures of motives but have direct evidence on firms’ 
co-operation motives. This allows us to look at firm characteristics, ranging from 
their innovation activities to the industry they belong to, that lead firms to co-
operate for one or the other reason, instead of analysing the co-operation decision 
in general and using proxies for the motives. This analysis will serve as the basis 
for generating a profile of firms that co-operate for a given reason on their 
                                                 
1 We will use the term “firm” throughout this paper even though the unit of observations for the Canadian 
Survey of Innovation is the establishment and the term used in the questionnaire is “plant”. For more 
details on the methodology of the survey see the website of Statistics Canada: www.statcan.ca/cgi-
bin/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getSurvey&SDDS=4218&lang=en&db=IMDB&dbg=f&adm=8&dis=2 
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innovation activities and may help policy makers to target the right group of 
firms if they e.g. see the need for more innovation co-operation on 
commercialization. In that respect our study is closely related to the empirical 
work that deals with the characteristics of firms co-operating with specific 
partners (see e.g. Mohnen and Hoareau, 2003). 
Our study’s set-up is similar to the studies that differentiate between different 
co-operation partners. Its focus is however not on investigating the motives for 
cooperating with a certain partner, but rather to develop a typology of firms that 
co-operate for a given reason.  
The following section will review the literature on motives for innovation co-
operation with a focus on the more recent empirical findings. In section 3 we will 
describe the data we use and the set-up of the empirical model. Section 4 presents 
the results of our econometric analysis. Finally, section 5 will conclude and 
provide some ideas for future research. 
2 Literature Review 
The literature review has two main parts. First, we will review some of the 
empirical literature on the motives for innovation and R&D co-operation. This 
section is meant to provide some background on the motives included in the 
questionnaire, which we will use to construct our dependent variables. The 
second part of the review will focus on papers looking at the characteristics of 
firms that collaborate with external partners on innovation activities. The 
distinction between the two sections is not always clear cut, as most authors from 
the second group interpret their findings on firm characteristics and innovation 
behaviour as motives for innovation co-operation.  
Motives for Innovation Co-operation2 
Initiated by the increase in inter-firm innovation co-operation, a large body of 
literature on firms’ motives for co-operating on R&D and innovation activities 
emerged (for an overview of the earlier empirical papers see Hagedoorn, 1993). 
This new strand of literature stresses the role of R&D co-operation in transferring 
knowledge between actors in an economy. The link between knowledge 
spillovers and R&D co-operation is now very well established in both the 
empirical and theoretical literature on R&D co-operation. Many papers have 
shown that generating, internalizing and preventing knowledge spillovers 
                                                 
2 We will use the terms „R&D co-operation“ and „innovation co-operation” interchangeably. The former 
term is used in most empirical studies on the subject although the data used covers co-operation on 
innovation activities other than R&D activities as well. 
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between firms and firms and public institutions are an important motive for co-
operation (e.g. Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Kaiser, 2002; Belderbos et al., 
2004; D'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Kamien et al., 1992; De Bondt and 
Veugelers, 1991).  
Another strand of literature dealing with this topic is the resource based view 
(RBV) of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). Starting points for the 
arguments brought forward by the RBV on R&D co-operation are the papers by 
Richardson (1972); Barney (1991) and Teece (1986). They argue that it may be 
necessary for firms to access complementary external resources in order to be 
able to exploit their own internally held resources better. This is the case in 
particular if firms’ own resources are immobile and can not be exchanged 
through regular market transactions. Firms which want to profit from their 
immobile resources by combining it with external knowledge have thus to co-
operate with the firm possessing these complementary resources (Hagedoorn et 
al., 2000; Tsang, 2000). Mowery and his co-authors summarize their discussion 
of the research based view and partner choice for co-operation by stating “the 
resource based-view argues that a key motive for the formation of alliances is the 
desire of participants to acquire capabilities from an external source.” (Mowery 
et al., 1998: 511). Empirical evidence for the RBV’s arguments has been 
provided by Cantner and Meder (2006). They show that firms’ incentives to co-
operate on R&D are higher if the potential partner has complimentary (and high-
value) knowledge. For co-operation with suppliers and clients Miotti and 
Sachwald (2003) find: the main motives are “to pool complimentary resources 
and access more market information” (Miotti and Sachwald, 2003: 1496). 
Similarly, some authors of the RBV argue that R&D co-operation between firms 
are undertaken in order to learn from the partners in the co-operative agreement 
(Caloghirou et al., 2003; Tsang, 2000). Alliances – a special form of co-operation 
- are also seen as a method to transfer tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1967) across 
firm boundaries (Kogut, 1988).  
Other motives beyond knowledge transfer and access to knowledge have been 
discussed in the empirical and theoretical literature3. Hagedoorn (1993) compiled 
the following list of strategic motives based on a large literature review of studies 
on the determinants of R&D co-operation (mainly in large firms) before 1993: 
                                                 
3 The most fundamental of all co-operation motives is of course to generate (long- and/or short-term) 
profits from innovation co-operation. That R&D co-operation can lead to an increase in the 
innovative (and economic success) of firms has been empirically confirmed by Cincera et al. (2003) 
and Aschhoff and Schmidt (2006) to name a few. 
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Table 1 An Overview of Motives for (Strategic) Inter-Firm Technology Co-
operation 
I Motives related to basic and applied research and some general 
characteristics of technological development: 
- Increased complexity and inter-sectoral nature of new technologies, cross-
fertilization of scientific disciplines and fields of technology, monitoring of 
evolution of technologies, technological synergies, access to scientific 
knowledge or to complementary technology  
- Reduction, minimizing and sharing of uncertainty in R&D 
- Reduction and sharing of costs of R&D 
II Motives related to concrete innovation processes 
- Capturing of partner's tacit knowledge of technology, technology transfer, 
technological leapfrogging 
- Shortening of product life cycle, reducing the period between innovation 
and market introduction 
III Motives related to market access and search for opportunities 
- Monitoring of environmental changes and opportunities 
- Internationalization, globalization and entry to foreign markets 
- New products and markets, market entry, expansion of product range 
Source: Hagedoorn, 1993: 373 (shortened). 
Sakakibara (1997) supports the view that the sharing of costs and risks4 is a 
basic motive for co-operation. She argues that firms try to reduce their own project costs 
by cooperating with external partners. Since expensive projects usually also bear a high 
risk for the firms undertaking them cost and risk sharing as a motive for co-operation 
are related to each other5.  
Miotti and Sachwald (2003) find support for the last group of motives in Hagedoorn’s 
list. They show that firms co-operate in R&D in order to be able to access new (foreign) 
markets. Bayona et al. (2001) in a study of over 1,600 Spanish firms, does not find a 
significant effect of market access motives on the likelihood for R&D co-operation, 
though. They support Sakakibara (1997) and find that cost-sharing and uncertainty are 
motivations for R&D co-operation among firms.  
Veugelers and Cassiman (2005), Belderbos et al. (2004), Kaiser and Licht 
(1998), Dachs et al. (2004), Bönte and Keilbach (2005), Fontana et al. (2005) and 
many other researchers investigate motives for different types of R&D 
partnerships, like co-operation with vertically related suppliers and customers, 
horizontally related competitors or public research institutions. All these studies 
agree that the importance of a certain motive differs for R&D co-operation with 
                                                 
4 See also Banerjee and Lin, 2001. 
5 Contrastingly, Veugelers and Cassiman (2005) and Schmidt (2005b) show that cost and risk have 
opposite effects on the likelihood of firms to co-operate: While risk-sharing has a negative effect, 
cost-sharing has a positive effect.  
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different partners. This does not mean, however, that they agree on all the 
motives for the different types of R&D co-operation. 
To summarize this first part of the literature review, the main motives for 
innovation co-operation seem to be access to (complementary) knowledge, the 
sharing of cost and risk for developing innovations and getting access to new 
markets. 
Factors Influencing Firms’ Innovation Co-operation Decisions 
Miotti and Sachwald (2003) use data from the French CIS II innovation survey 
to analyse the impact of various factors on a firm’s R&D co-operation decision. 
The factors they look at range from the size of the firm and its industry, to the 
market share, public funding, obstacles to innovation and permanent R&D. One 
finding of their study is that “a strong research orientation substantially increases 
their [firms’] propensity to co-operate” (Miotti and Sachwald, 2003: 1490). 
Bayona et al. (2001) support Miotti and Sachwald (2003) on the effect of R&D 
activities and show that in-house R&D activities and belonging to a highly 
technology-intensive industry increase a firm’s propensity to collaborate on 
innovation activities. Bayona et al. (2001) interpret their finding as a positive 
influence of absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990) on the 
probability of co-operating on R&D. Dachs et al. (2004) and Belderbos et al. 
(2004) use the innovation-intensity, i.e. the share of R&D expenditure over total 
turnover, to represent absorptive capacity in their models6 and also find a 
positive influence on the probability to co-operate on innovation activities. In 
addition to representing a firm’s ability to source external knowledge these 
indicators can also been seen as a measure of the need of firms for external 
knowledge (Fritsch and Lukas, 2001). Other studies that find a positive link 
between own R&D and innovation co-operation include Fritsch and Lukas 
(2001), Bönte and Keilbach (2005) and Fontana et al. (2005). Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2002) (2-step results) and Rocha (1999) do not find a significant 
influence, however. 
Absorptive capacity is closely related to knowledge, so is the importance of 
legal and strategic protection methods for inventions, which are supposed to 
protect knowledge from flowing out (see Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Bönte 
and Keilbach, 2005). Dachs et al. (2004) find different effects for the usage of 
strategic and formal methods of protection for inventions and innovations 
between Austria and Finland. In Finland the likelihood to co-operate on 
innovation activities increases significantly, if the firm uses strategic and formal 
protection methods, in Austria it does not. Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) have 
discussed this topic under the label of “appropriability”. They find that the higher 
                                                 
6 See Schmidt (2005a) for a review of empirical measures of absorptive capacity. 
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the importance of strategic protection methods for a Belgium firm, the more 
likely it is to co-operate. 
Dachs et al., 2004 investigate the role of the novelty of a product innovation in 
a firm’s co-operation decision and find that firms which develop and introduce 
products new to their market (“market novelties”) are more likely to co-operate 
with external partners than others. Furthermore Capron and Cincera, 2004 argue 
that the development of more novel products requires more fundamental research 
than the development of less novel products. If the firm does not have the 
necessary capacity to conduct fundamental research in-house it is very likely to 
co-operate with external partners (in particular universities) to access their 
knowledge. 
Abramovsky et al. (2005) find that the recipients of public support are more 
likely to co-operate than firms without public support in all four European 
countries they look at, i.e. France, Germany, the UK and Spain. Negassi (2004) 
also shows that a firm is more likely to co-operate on innovation activities if it 
receives public support. Busom and Fernandez-Ribas (2004) find a positive 
effect of participation in national R&D programs on the likelihood to cooperate 
using data from the Spanish innovation survey of 1999. Dachs et al. (2004) 
present one of the few studies on European data that does not find a positive 
impact of public support on the probability of co-operating on innovation 
activities in general. They do find a significant positive impact for Finland, but 
not for Austria. However, in Austria public funding has a positive and significant 
impact on co-operating with universities and public research institutions and 
customers, which can be attributed to the fact that many public funding programs 
are directed to foster co-operation between public institutions and private firms. 
As far as some more general firm characteristics are concerned, Miotti and 
Sachwald (2003) show that larger firms, firms from high-tech and medium-high-
tech sector and firms belonging to a group are more likely to co-operate7. The 
former finding, i.e. that firm size has a positive effect on the likelihood of co-
operating in R&D, is supported by many other empirical studies (e.g. Röller et 
al., 1997, Link and Bauer, 1987 and Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002 (inverse u-
shaped)). Bönte and Keilbach (2005) confirm this finding for informal 
collaboration. They show that larger firms are more likely to collaborate with 
customers and suppliers both formally and informally than small firms. There are 
several reasons why size has a positive influence on the probability to co-operate: 
Dachs et al. (2004) for example argue in their literature review that large firms 
are more likely to have the resources to actively look for partners for their 
innovation projects and are thus more likely to co-operate than small firms. Large 
firms also have a higher incentive to cooperate with external partners simply 
                                                 
7 Belonging to a group has been shown to have a negative effect on co-operating with horizontally related 
firms by Belderbos et al. (2004). Mohnen and Hoareau (2003) show that belonging to a group reduces 
the likelihood of co-operating with public research institutions. The likelihood to co-operate in general 
increases, however, if the firm belongs to a group. 
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because they focus on their core business and have to acquire complementary 
knowledge and services from outside their own boundaries (Gerybadze, 2004). 
Fritsch and Lukas (2001) present another argument for the influence of size. 
They argue that if “there exists a given probability for co-operation per unit of 
economic activity” (Fritsch and Lukas, 2001: 300) then large firms should be 
more likely to conduct co-operative R&D than small firms with less economic 
activity. The argument goes like this, the more economic activity a firm has the 
more likely it is to have innovative projects and the more innovative projects it 
has the more likely it becomes to co-operate on innovation. Bayona et al. (2001) 
is no exception to the rule. In a study of over 1,600 Spanish R&D performing 
firms, they find that larger firms are more likely to co-operate than smaller firms.  
As far as the industry is concerned, Tether (2002) finds that low technology 
firms in services are less likely to cooperate than firms from other industry 
groups. Similarly, Dodgson (1994) shows that high-tech industries are more 
likely to co-operate on R&D activities. Descriptive statistics from the CIS for the 
member states of the European Union also show significant differences in the 
share of firms involved in R&D co-operation in each industry (European 
Commission, 2004). These results can partially be attributed to different R&D 
intensities and funding schemes in different industries. Bönte and 
Keilbach (2005) find that firms in more dynamic industries are more likely to co-
operate both formally and informally.  
Another general characteristic of firms is their export orientation. Dachs et 
al. (2004) argue that the export orientation of firms matters for their R&D co-
operation decision. They do not find empirical evidence for this hypothesis, 
however. Similarly, Busom and Fernandez-Ribas (2004) do not find empirical 
evidence for a link between export intensity, measured as the share of exports 
over total sales, and the likelihood of cooperating on R&D activities. They reject 
their hypothesis that exporting firms have access to a larger variety and number 
of potential co-operation partners (e.g. international firms) than non-exporting 
firms and are thus more likely to cooperate. 
In summary, the existing literature shows that several different innovation and 
R&D activities of firms have an influence on the probability to co-operate. 
Besides these factors, general firm characteristics and framework conditions, like 
their size and industry do also play a role in their innovation co-operation 
decision. 
3 Analytical Framework 
The analytical approach of most of the recent studies on innovation co-
operation (e.g. Belderbos et al., 2004; Abramovsky et al., 2005; Miotti and 
Sachwald, 2003; Veugelers and Cassiman, 2005; Dachs et al., 2004; Bönte and 
Keilbach, 2005) – all using data from the Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) - 
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is very similar: They construct measures of firms’ co-operative behaviour, 
knowledge spillovers, and other factors influencing the innovation co-operation 
decision, from questions on sources of information for innovation activities or 
obstacles to innovation activities and other questions. Their approach is to 
determine the effect of these proxy measures on the likelihood that a firm co-
operates by regressing them on a dummy variable which takes the value one if 
the firm co-operates on innovation activities during a given reference period. The 
independent variables which are significant are then interpreted as a motive for 
R&D co-operation. As with all proxy measures the argument is that the 
constructed measure is closely related to the actual underlying motive.  
Our approach is different: The Canadian Survey of Innovation 2005 contains a 
direct question on the motives for innovation co-operation, which covers most of 
the motives listed in the literature review above. They range from the sharing of 
costs for innovation activities, gaining access to critical expertise to accessing 
new markets. This data allows us to address how firms’ innovation behaviour and 
characteristics influence their R&D co-operation motives. We follow the existing 
literature in analysing different types of innovation co-operation, but instead of 
distinguishing innovation co-operations by the partners involved (e.g. Belderbos 
et al., 2004) or the intensity of the relationship (e.g. Bönte and Keilbach, 2005), 
we distinguish them by their underlying motive. The proxy measures used to 
represent the motives in the existing literature can thus no longer be interpreted 
as the motives for R&D co-operation but are rather indicators of the innovation 
behaviour of firms, public support for R&D and more general firm 
characteristics. We will thus be able to identify the relationship between these 
indicators (part 2 of the literature review) and some of the motives for co-
operation (part 1of the literature review). 
An example of a study similar to ours is the one by Hagedoorn (1993). He 
analyses data from the MERIT-CATI database on published innovation and 
R&D co-operations between firms, which contains direct information on the 
motives underlying the co-operative agreements. Using descriptive statistics he 
shows that the motives for R&D co-operation differ significantly across 
industries. Beyond this study the literature provides (to our knowledge) little 
evidence on which factors influence which type of R&D co-operation motives. 
To structure our analysis we will look at the two areas identified in the literature 
review for potential determinants: firms’ innovation behaviour and general firm 
characteristics. Public support for R&D is without a doubt an input for the 
innovation activities of firms. We will nonetheless treat it as separate category, 
given that it represents the factor that can most easily and directly be influenced 
by policy makers. 
The actual measures used to represent these three groups and their expected 
effects on the motives will be described in the following section. The choice of 
variables for each of the three groups is mainly based on those variables used in 
the literature. To some degree our study is still exploratory, however, given the 
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scarcity of literature on our specific topic, i.e. factors that influence the choice of 
co-operating for a specific motive. 
The following figure summarizes our analytical framework: 
Figure 1 Analytical Framework for the Empirical Part of the Paper 
 
4 Data and Empirical Model 
In order to investigate the factors which influence the choice of co-operation 
motives, we use the 2005 Survey of Innovation of the Science, Innovation and 
Electronic Information Division (SIEID) at Statistics Canada. The mandatory 
survey was undertaken between September 2005 and March 2006 and covers 
firms with 20 or more employees and at least $250,000 in revenues in the 
Canadian manufacturing sector (NAICS 31-33)8. A stratified random sample9 of 
8,902 firms was selected. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or senior managers 
of the firms chosen were sent a mail questionnaire. This questionnaire contains 
questions on firms’ innovation behaviour and their characteristics for the 
reference period 2002 to 2004.  The definitions of the concepts used in the 
questionnaire are based on the so called “Oslo Manual” (OECD and Eurostat, 
1997), the international handbook for innovation surveys. The data was produced 
respecting the quality standards of Statistics Canada, namely, data relevance, 
accuracy, timeliness, accessibility, interpretability and coherence.10  
                                                 
8 The survey also covered logging (NAICS 1133), which is excluded from our analysis. 
9 The stratification is based on the industry, region (province or groups of provinces/territories in the case 
of the western provinces and the territories) and establishment size. 
10 Additional Information on the survey and the questionnaire used can be found on the Statistics Canada 
Website at the following address: http://www.statcan.ca/english/sdds/4218.htm 
Firms’ innovation 
behaviour 
Public R&D support 
Firm characteristics 
and framework 
conditions 
 
 
R&D co-operation with a 
specific motive: 
Cost sharing,  
Accessing knowledge, 
Scaling up-production 
Commercialization motives 
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Construction of the Dependent Variables 
Statistic Canada’s Survey of Innovation 2005 contains a number of questions 
on firms’ innovation co-operation behaviour, like the type of partner and its 
location and the motives for innovation co-operation11. The latter will be the 
main focus of our study. In the survey firms are asked to indicate their motives 
for innovation co-operation between 2002 and 200412 in two broad categories, 
development of innovation and commercialization of innovation. The first 
category covers sharing of costs, accessing R&D, accessing critical expertise, 
prototype development and scaling up production processes. The second group of 
motives contains two commercialization motives, access to new markets and 
access to new distribution channels. In the “Innovation Analysis Bulletin” of 
Statistics Canada Michael Bordt wrote that the “commercialization of innovation 
focuses on the contribution to the economy of new and significantly improved 
products” (Michael Bordt, 2005: 3). This motive does not exclusively apply to 
product innovators, however. We find a number of firms that have only 
introduced process innovations between 2002 and 2004, but co-operated for 
commercialization reasons with external partners. A reason for this finding may 
be that they are commercializing older innovations or are already preparing for 
the commercialization of upcoming products. Given the evidence that process 
innovators also co-operate for commercialization reasons, we do not restrict our 
sample to product innovators, but analyse the factors influencing the decision to 
collaborate with external partners to commercialize innovations for both product 
and process innovators. The dependent variable representing this motive is 
labelled m_com. 
In addition to commercialization motives, we will also look at the development 
of innovations as a motive for collaboration. Since almost all co-operating firms 
in our sample indicated that at least one of the items listed under “development 
of innovation” was an important motive for innovation co-operation, we split-up 
the development motives into three subgroups: sharing of costs for developing 
innovations (m_cost), accessing external knowledge (m_knowl) comprising of 
                                                 
11 The Canadian Survey of Innovation 2005 is one of the few surveys which contains a direct question on 
the motives for innovation co-operation. The other surveys we are aware of are the 2002 Swiss 
Innovation Survey and the 2003 New Zealand Innovation Survey. The MERIT-CATI database also 
contains direct evidence on the motives for co-operation (see Hagedoorn, 1993), it covers only co-
operative agreements published in a wide range of technological and scientific journals. 
12 The exact question was phrased as follows: “Please check which of the following reasons were 
important in determining the involvement of your business unit in co-operative arrangements to 
develop or commercialize new or significantly improved products (goods or services) and/or 
processes.” Firms had to answer this question if they had answered “yes” to the following question 
“During the three years, 2002 to 2004, did your plant co-operate on any of your innovation activities 
with other firms or institutions?” which was supplemented by a definition of innovation co-
operation: ”Innovation co-operation is active participation with other firms or organizations on 
innovation activities. Exclude pure contracting out of work where there is no active co-operation.” 
(Statistics Canada, 2005). 
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accessing R&D and accessing critical expertise and the third group scaling up 
production processes (m_scale)13. All the variables representing the motives in 
the empirical model are dummy variables, which take the value one if the firm 
has indicated that the given motive was important for co-operating on innovation 
activities between 2002 and 2004.14 Since we are interested in co-operation with 
external partners, we excluded six observations. These were firms which are only 
co-operating with other firms within their firm15.  
Descriptive Statistics show that the most important motive for co-operation in 
all industry groups is to access external knowledge (critical expertise and R&D 
done by other firms). Over 81% of all firms that co-operated between 2002 and 
2004 did it for this reason. Commercialization motives, sharing cost-risk and 
scaling up production processes were less important. These other motives are 
deemed important by less than 50% of the innovating firms. In some industries 
however cost-sharing is a motive relevant to more than 50% of cooperating firms 
with the exception of cost-sharing (science: 53.7% and specialized industry: 
64.2%). Scaling up production is mentioned by 53.3% of co-operating firms in 
scale-intensive industries as an important motive for R&D co-operation. 
Table 2 Percentage of Firms that Co-operated on Innovation Activities for a 
Given Motive between 2002 and 2004, by Industry Groups16  
Industry 
Groups Sharing the cost of 
developing 
innovations 
Accessing research 
and development 
(R&D), accessing 
critical expertise 
Scaling up 
Production 
Processes 
Accessing new 
markets, 
accessing new 
distribution 
channels 
Resource 
intensive 46.1% 83.4% 47.4% 46.4% 
Labour  
intensive  45.4% 74.5% 35.0% 44.1% 
Scale  
intensive 49.3% 78.3% 53.3% 47.4% 
Science 53.7% 87.9% 49.3% 44.9% 
Specialized 64.2% 90.1% 22.0% 49.1% 
Total 49.8% 81.4% 42.5% 45.9% 
Source: Statistics Canada - Survey of Innovation 2005. 
                                                 
13 Except for the last motive (m_scale), these motives can be found under different headings in 
Hagedoorn’s table presented on page 4 of this paper. 
14 A more detailed description of these and the other variables included in our empirical model is given in 
Table 4 in the appendix. 
15 Note, even after dropping these observations we are not able to fully distinguish between motives for 
collaboration with external partners and collaboration with internal partners because some firms have 
collaborated with both types of partners between 2002 and 2004 and not just external ones.  
16 See Table 5 in the appendix for details on the construction of the industry variables. 
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Construction of the Independent Variables 
The three different groups of factors that potentially influence the motives firms 
have for co-operating with external partners are represented in our empirical 
model by the following set of independent variables: 
 Firms’ innovation behaviour is included in the model, by adding dummy 
variables for the degree of novelty17 of their product and process innovations 
(pdnov and pznov), innovation activities related to the market introduction of 
innovations (act_market), innovation activities related to post-introduction 
commercialization of products (act_com) and internal R&D activities 
(act_rdintp). In addition to these qualitative measures we also included the 
innovation intensity, measured as the percentage of a firm’s total sales that were 
devoted to innovation activities in 2004 (inno_int and inno_int2), the share of 
employees involved in R&D activities in 2004 (rdp), the share of employees with 
at least a university degree (uni), and an index of the “basicness” of the firms 
innovation approach (basic). We try to capture the “basicness” by calculating the 
ratio between the importance of institutional source of information for 
innovations and the importance of market sources, a method similar to the one 
used by Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) and Abramovsky et al. (2005). To 
capture some of the strategic aspect of the innovation activities of firms we also 
include a measure for the importance firms assign to strategic (prot_strat) and 
formal protection (prot_form) methods for innovations and inventions, 
respectively. These two measures indicate how concerned firms are about 
protecting their knowledge from being used by others (see literature review) and 
how important innovations are for the firm. Besides, in order to be able to protect 
an invention with patent or trademark protection methods it has to fulfill the 
novelty criteria (“inventive step”) laid down in the patent and trademark laws. 
The importance of formal protection methods can thus also be seen as an 
additional measure of the novelty of an invention or innovation. The importance 
of strategic and formal protection methods can also be interpreted as an 
indication of the framework conditions and the technological environment under 
which firms co-operate, because the importance of certain protection methods is 
certainly not independent of the technology of a firm’s industry and the 
behaviour of other firms. 
Our choice of variables to represent the innovation behaviour of firms allows us 
to look at inputs to the innovation process (inno_int, rdp, uni, act_rdintp), the 
innovation strategy (basic, prot_strat, prot_form)18, outputs of innovation 
activities (pd_nov, pz_nov) and activities related to the introduction and 
commercialization of the output (act_com, act_market). 
                                                 
17 Products and processes can be either new to the firm, new to the province/territory, new to Canada, new 
to North America or new to the world. 
18 Some of the other variables could also be considered innovation strategy like the novelty of products 
and processes introduced. 
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A second group of factors we include in our empirical model are firm 
characteristics and framework conditions for innovation activities. They are 
discussed under one group since some factors can be attributed to both 
subgroups, like the industry a firm is operating in (ress-int, labor-int, scale-int, 
science, specialized)19. The industry is certainly a feature that describes the firm, 
but it also sets the framework conditions for its activities. Similarly, the obstacles 
a firm faces with respect to its innovation activities are shaped by its environment 
but also by its own set-up and capabilities. We include the relative importance of 
obstacles related to the development of innovations compared to obstacles to the 
commercialization of innovation (obst_rel) in our empirical model. Besides the 
industry of the firm and the importance of obstacles, this second group of 
independent variables also included the export share of the firm, i.e. the 
percentage of total revenue that came from sales in markets outside of Canada 
(exp_share), a measure of the concentration on the demand-side (demand), a 
dummy variable indicating if the firm is part of a group of firms or an 
independent firm by itself (group) and a firm’s size, measured as the number of 
employees (lnemp and lnemp2). 
The final group of independent variables is actually not a group, since it 
comprises only a dummy variable, which is one if the firm has received any 
public funding or support for its innovation activities (public).  
Most of the variables we construct are only available for firms that innovated 
between 2002 and 2004. Limiting our sample to firms that innovated during this 
three year period leaves us with 4021 observations which represent 10860 firms 
of the total population.  
Expected Effects on Different Co-operation Motives 
The expected effects of these factors on the choice of motives for innovation 
co-operation are the following: 
 We would expect the novelty of a product or process innovation to have a 
positive effect on the likelihood that firms co-operate with external partners in 
order to acquire knowledge, because the development of more novel products 
usually involves more risk than modifying existing products and also requires 
knowledge from different domains, which is not available from sources within 
the firm.  
The effect of the three innovation activities: innovation intensity, share of 
employees involved in R&D activities, “basicness” of their innovation approach 
and the share of employees with a university degree is less clear. High values of 
these measure indicate that the firm has a high absorptive capacity (see Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1989, 1990), which allows the firm to access a wide range of 
external knowledge even without co-operating. It also shows that the firm has the 
                                                 
19 The specialized industries will be used as the reference category in the estimations.  
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ability to generate knowledge it needs for its innovation activities internally, 
which should decrease the likelihood that it needs to access external knowledge. 
On the other hand, it may be more likely to co-operate to access critical 
complementary knowledge, because its own innovation and R&D activities 
enlarge its “technological horizon” and open up different uses of its own 
knowledge that may require additional external knowledge to be turned into 
products. The empirical findings presented in the literature review propose a 
positive impact of various measures of absorptive capacity on the probability of 
co-operating on innovation in general. 
The expected effect of the size of a firm is also ambiguous. On the one hand, if 
larger firms were more diversified than smaller firms then they should be more 
likely to co-operate on several projects for several different reasons. On the other 
hand, larger firms have more knowledge and resources inside the firm and are 
thus less dependent on external contributions. 
The use of protection methods indicates that a firm is concerned with protecting 
the knowledge it generates internally. Whether this leads to more co-operation or 
less is uncertain. Firms will have to co-operate with each other in order to be able 
to access and use each others knowledge, but they may also be reluctant to do so, 
because they are concerned with giving access to their knowledge to external 
partners. If the latter is the case we should see a negative effect of the importance 
of protection methods on motives that involve knowledge sharing. The so called 
“open innovation” paradigm (see Chesbrough, 2003) suggests that firms use 
patents and other protection methods to disseminate their knowledge and in order 
to profit from the use of their own knowledge by others. This can be interpreted 
as suggesting that firms that assign a high importance to formal protection 
methods are more likely to co-operate on the commercialization of their 
inventions and innovations. 
Public funding for innovation activities has been shown to have a positive 
influence on the likelihood that a firm co-operates. If it leads firms to co-operate 
for specific motives is less clear however and is likely to depend on the type of 
public program the firm is involved in. Since our measure is based on a wide 
range of public programs we have no particular expectation about this variable 
per se. 
The expected effect of the rest of the variables is easier to determine: We 
expect firms from industries related to science to co-operate on motives related to 
knowledge, while labour- and resource-intensive firms should be more likely to 
co-operate to scale up production and commercialization innovations. We also 
expect that firms try to overcome obstacles to innovation activities by co-
operating. The analysis of cost and risk motives as well as the resource based 
view (access to complementarities) supports this assumption. Therefore firms 
that have relatively more problems with obstacles related to commercialization 
should be more likely to co-operate with external partners to commercialize 
innovations and vice versa.  
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The expected effect of concentration on the demand side is a negative one: 
concentration should decrease firms’ propensity to co-operate for 
commercialization motives. Firms which serve only a few customers do not need 
to partner with other firms to adequately serve these customers. They might even 
just custom make solutions or innovations for their customers.  
The export share should have a positive effect on all motives. A high export 
share is an indication of more intense competition and should lead firms to co-
operate, both to develop innovations for foreign markets and to be able to access 
the foreign markets.  
Econometric Model 
The choice of the empirical model to investigate if the expected effects do 
materialise is not straight forward as some issues have to be addressed.  
A first issue concerns the dependent variables: The firms were not asked to 
provide answers on the motives for each of their individual co-operative 
arrangements, but to give a general assessment of the importance of the motives 
for all of them. The answers represent a more general view of co-operation on 
innovation. It is thus not surprising that some firms ticketed more than one option 
on the questions of motives, i.e. they had more than one motive for co-operating 
with external partners. It is also feasible to assume that the decision to co-operate 
on innovation activities for one motive is not independent of the decision to co-
operate for another motive. As a result the dependent variables are not 
independent of each other. In order to take this into account, we will use a 
multivariate probit estimation procedure which allows us to model a correlation 
between the different motives via the error term, instead of four independent 
probit models. 
A second issue is selectivity. Only those firms that were involved in innovation 
co-operations between 2002 and 2004 were asked to indicate their motives for 
innovation co-operation. This gives rise to a sample selection problem described 
by (Heckman, 1976; 1979). The general idea behind Heckman’s model is that the 
standard OLS or probit estimations are biased if the dependent variable which is 
supposed to be explained is only observed for a specific group of firms in the 
sample. In our case the motives for co-operation can only be observed if firms 
actually co-operated between 2002 and 2004. The solution proposed by Heckman 
is to estimate a two equation model. However, in order to be able to apply his 
model at least one variable is necessary that only influences the first decision but 
not the second. In our case this would mean that we would need a variable that 
only influences the decision to co-operate, but not the motives for co-operating. 
Obviously such a variable does not exist and the Heckman procedure can not be 
applied. What is more, even though the question in the questionnaire is structured 
as if the decision to co-operate and the decision on the motives for co-operation 
were taken in a sequence and were two distinct decision, i.e. first answer the 
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question if you co-operated and conditional on saying yes, they provide 
information on their motives, this is obviously not the case.20 
To arrive at consistent estimates anyway we use a set-up similar to Belderbos et 
al. (2004) and Capron and Cincera (2004) 21, i.e. we set all the variables on 
motives to zero for firms that did not co-operate between 2002 and 2004. By 
applying this procedure we will analyse the decision to co-operate for a specific 
motive and not the decision to co-operate on innovation for a given motive 
conditional on having decided to co-operate on innovation (see Capron and 
Cincera, 2004): 9 for a discussion of these issues). All the independent, 
explanatory variables are not affected by this procedure as they are available for 
co-operating and non-cooperating firms. 
Finally, the data we use for the analysis is from a random stratified sample and 
not from a random sample. In order to take this into account, we include the 
weight (inverse probability of being drawn) of each observation (dweight) in our 
model. 
Our formal model looks like this: 
 
Coopcost=β’ 1 X+ε1     with  Coopcost=1 if Coopcost *>0 
Coopcost=0 otherwise 
 
Coopknowl= β’ 2 X+ε2    with  Coopknowl=1 if Coopknowl *>0 
Coopknowl=0 otherwise 
 
Coopprod= β’ 3 X+ε3     with  Coopprod=1 if Coopprod *>0 
Coopprod=0 otherwise 
 
Coopcom= β’ 4 X+ε4     with  Coopcom=1 if Coopcom *>0 
Coopcom=0 otherwise 
 
where X is the set of independent variables described above. The specific 
feature of the multivariat probit model is that the pair-wise correlation of the 
error terms is not equal to zero: 
Cov(εi, εj)=ρk for all i ≠ j and k = 1,..., 6 
                                                 
20 See Mohnen and Hoareau (2003) for a discussion of a similar issue regarding the co-operation 
questions in innovation surveys. 
21 Belderbos et al. (2004) and Capron and Cincera (2004) use this method to look at co-operation with 
different partners. Their survey is set-up similar to the one we use, i.e. the partner is only observed if 
the firm co-operated. Miotti and Sachwald (2003) restrict their sample to co-operating firms and 
analyse the decision to co-operate with different partners for this sub-sample without taking 
selectivity into account. Because Heckman showed that these estimates are biased we decided to 
employ the method of Belderbos et al. (2004) and Capron and Cincera (2004) in this paper. 
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This model can be solved by employing a maximum-likelihood procedure. To 
evaluate the likelihood of a certain outcome, the probability of an observation has 
to be calculated using a four-variate normal probability density function. This 
poses some problems: It has been shown that standard numerical calculation 
techniques cannot be used if the normal density function is of an order higher 
than two.22 A way to solve this problem involves using simulation techniques. 
One, which is now implemented in many statistical packages, is the so-called 
“GHK-Simulator (Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane-Simulator)” for multivariate 
normal distributions23. For our model estimation we use a command programmed 
by Antoine Terracol for the STATA statistical software package (mvprobit), 
which relies on the GHK simulation procedure.24 
                                                 
22 See Glasgow (2001) for a discussion of the topic. 
23 Other simulators could also be used. Hajivassiliou et al. (1996) review eleven simulators and find that 
the GHK is the most reliable method for multivariate normal distributions. 
24 The method is known to be sensitive to the number of observations drawn at each iterative step. We 
thus tested several different settings (100, 50 and 5 (default setting) iterations). The results only 
change as far as the size of the coefficients is concerned. The significance levels and qualitative 
results stay the same. The model presented in the results section uses 100. 
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5 Results 
The results of the multivariate probit estimation are presented in Table 325. A 
first result of our analysis is that cost-sharing and accessing external knowledge 
are chosen as innovation co-operation motives by relatively similar firms and that 
these firms are quite different from those co-operating to scale up production. 
Firms collaborating with motives related to commercialization of innovations are 
in the middle, as they share some features with those co-operating to share costs 
or get access to knowledge and those firms co-operating to scale up production 
processes. When interpreting these results one has to keep in mind that 
innovation co-operation in order to share costs, does not include cost-sharing for 
production and the like, but only sharing the cost for developing innovations. In 
that sense cost-sharing motives are related to knowledge sharing motives, as they 
both concern inputs (finance and knowledge) into the innovation process at the 
development stage. The two other motives, commercialization and scaling up 
production processes on the other hand are more closely related to the 
introduction and diffusion stage of the innovation process, with scaling up being 
between development and diffusion. Firms collaborating in order to 
commercialize products share some features with those scaling up production. 
They also share some characteristics with firms co-operating for the other two 
motives, which is an indication that our assumption that commercialization 
motives are not only related to current innovation projects but include 
innovations that were developed before the reference period could be correct. 
Firms collaborating on the commercialization of products might actually be 
doing both developing new innovations and commercializing existing (older) 
ones. 
                                                 
25 All Rhos are significant in the multivariate estimation, indicating that the decision to co-operate for one 
motive is not taken independently from the decision to co-operate for another motive. 
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Table 3 Coefficients of the Multivariat Probit Estimation (weighted) 
  Motive: 
Cost 
Sharing 
Motive: 
Know-
ledge 
Motive: 
Scaling up 
Product. 
Motive: 
Commerci
alization 
Innovation Intensity Inno_int 0.002 -0.003 -0.013z z 0.011* 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Innovation Intensity, sqrd Inno_int2 -0.00002 0.0001 0.0002z z -0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Share of R&D employees Rdp -0.005** -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Internal R&D Activities Act_rdintp 0.459** 0.427** 0.272* 0.195 
  (0.148) (0.118) (0.149) (0.140) 
Employees with univ. deg. Uni 0.006** 0.002 0.0003 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
„Basicness“ of inno. act. Basic 0.526*** 0.410*** 0.124 0.227** 
  (0.096) (0.095) (0.109) (0.113) 
Strategic protection meth. Prot_strat 0.360** 0.209** 0.177 0.110 
  (0.143) (0.100) (0.112) (0.115) 
Legal protection methods Prot_form 0.225* 0.396*** 0.370** 0.213* 
  (0.130) (0.124) (0.148) (0.128) 
Product first Nor. America Pdnov_4 -0.104 -0.045 -0.135 0.128 
  (0.106) (0.108) (0.146) (0.119) 
Product world first Pdnov_5 0.085 0.068 -0.078 0.133 
  (0.112) (0.109) (0.137) (0.123) 
Process first Nor. America Pznov_4 0.367*** 0.387*** 0.074 0.058 
  (0.140) (0.141) (0.174) (0.157) 
Process world first Pznov_5 0.226 0.121 0.271 0.181 
  (0.156) (0.151) (0.191) (0.192) 
Market Introduction Act. Act_market -0.129 0.124 0.171 0.143 
  (0.149) (0.098) (0.117) (0.118) 
Post-intr. Commerc. Act. Act_com 0.023 0.007 0.174* 0.119 
  (0.080) (0.074) (0.097) (0.083) 
Obstacles to innovation Obst_rel -0.023 -0.008 -0.026 -0.057* 
  (0.027) (0.022) (0.024) (0.031) 
Public Support for Innov. Public 0.097 0.154*** 0.043 0.133 
  (0.089) (0.080) (0.103) (0.094) 
Size, natural log Lnemp -0.039zzz -0.248zz -0.144 0.156 
  (0.228) (0.222) (0.254) (0.248) 
Size, natural log, squared Lnemp2 0.017 zzz 0.035zz 0.022 -0.016 
  (0.023) (0.022) (0.027) (0.026) 
(table continues on next page)     
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Export-Share Exp_share -0.002* -0.002* -0.0001 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Demand-side concentra. Demand 0.003 0.002 0.003* -0.0001 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Part of a group of firms Group 0.121 0.101 0.124 -0.034 
  (0.089) (0.081) (0.107) (0.091) 
Resource-intensive ind. Ress-int -0.041 0.111 0.134 0.249* 
  (0.121) (0.122) (0.179) (0.149) 
Labour-intensive industry Labour-int 0.077 0.064 -0.045 0.175 
  (0.125) (0.119) (0.154) (0.141) 
Scale-intensive industry Scale-int 0.067 0.118 0.232 0.311** 
  (0.123) (0.117) (0.155) (0.141) 
Scientific industry Science 0.346*** 0.339*** -0.086 0.406*** 
  (0.134) (0.127) (0.159) (0.140) 
Constant  -2.35*** -1.63*** -1.976** -2.51*** 
  (0.557) (0.551) (0.625) (0.605) 
Observations  Unweighted : 4,021 Weighted: 10,860 
X^2   432.73  
Log-likelihood   -10,409.351  
Rhos  (1,2) 0.887*** (2,3) 0.864*** 
  (1,3) 0.746*** (2,4) 0.849*** 
  (1,4) 0.803*** (3,4) 0.792*** 
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% Significance-level    
z 10%, zz 5%, zzz 1% Joint significance-level    
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis  
Observations are weighted with the inverse of the probability to be sampled 
Source: Statistics Canada, Survey of Innovation 2005, author’s calculations 
Another general result of our analysis is that factors representing the innovation 
behaviour as well as variables representing framework conditions and firm 
characteristics do influence the choice of co-operation motive at least to a certain 
degree. We find relatively the most significant results for a firm’s innovation 
strategy in terms of their research approach and the use of protection methods. 
This indicates that the co-operation behaviour is embedded in the overall 
innovation strategy of firms.  
It also supports other studies that find that firms which are concerned with the 
protection of their inventions and innovations from spilling over to competitors 
are more likely to co-operate than other firms. Firms that protect knowledge and 
inventions through patents or trademarks are more likely to co-operate in general 
than firms that assign only little importance to formal protection methods, as the 
significance of this variable in all four equations indicates. Patents and 
trademarks may be a way to signal technological excellence to potential partners 
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and thus make firms more likely to co-operate with a firm holding a patent or 
trademark.26 As a result firms which assign a high importance to formal 
protection methods and want to co-operate may have it easier to find an adequate 
partner than other firms. For strategic protection methods this effect should not 
exist. We find however, that firms that assign a high importance to strategic 
protection methods are more likely to co-operate to share costs and access 
knowledge than firms which assign these methods less importance. The empirical 
papers looking at knowledge spillovers and R&D co-operation have found a 
positive effect of this variable on the likelihood to co-operate as well. They argue 
that it is an indication that firms try to channel knowledge outflows. What our 
results show is that the effect works mainly through cost-sharing and access to 
knowledge motives, without providing further information why this is the case. 
Turning to the more detailed results across the different motives, we find a 
positive and significant effect of internal R&D activities on the probability to co-
operate with external partners in order to share costs, scale up production and 
access knowledge. The share of employees with a university degree has a 
significant positive effect on cost-sharing only. The innovation intensity effects 
the motive scaling up production processes in a U-shaped fashion, i.e. up to an 
intensity of 32% the probability to collaborate in order to scale up production 
decreases and afterwards it increases.27 For commercialization motives we find a 
significant (90%-level) positive linear influence of innovation intensity. All these 
findings point to the importance of absorptive capacity for innovation co-
operation. As the literature review has shown, many authors find a positive 
influence of absorptive capacity on the likelihood of co-operating on innovation 
activities. Our findings add to this literature and show that different measures or 
components of absorptive capacity influence different motive for co-operation. 
The share of university graduates in total employment only influences co-
operation for reasons of cost-sharing. The negative influence of the innovation 
intensity in the scaling up production equation up to intensities of 32% does not 
necessarily imply that absorptive capacity has a negative influence on co-
operation in order to scale up production. This finding may very well be due to 
the fact that innovators with very low innovation intensities are doing little 
knowledge intensive activities in-house but rather focus on the adaptation, 
production and distribution of product innovations developed elsewhere. If the 
innovation intensity increases these firms seem to shift their focus from adapting 
innovations to more early stages of the innovation process and thus collaborate 
less to scale up production processes. Firms with higher innovation intensities 
seem to do both at the same time. If this scenario is true the innovation intensity 
                                                 
26 See Penin (2005) for a discussion of the role of patents in the collaboration process.  
27 The majority of firms have an innovation intensity of less than 32%, the number of firms with a higher 
intensity is fairly large, however, and is thus not considered as outlier values. 
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should be seen as an indicator of the type of innovation activity and not 
absorptive capacity.28 
Contrary to our expectation only the novelty of process innovation has a 
positive influence on some of the innovation motives (cost-sharing and access to 
knowledge). We would have expected a much more pronounced effect and in 
particular one related to product innovations, as usually more product than 
process innovations are jointly developed. What is even more surprising is that it 
is the first to North-America processes that influence the motives and not the 
world first processes. A reason for the latter finding could be that world first 
innovations are developed by firms at the technological frontier, which rely less 
on input from other firms, because the external knowledge is of little value to 
them. Firms which introduce new to North-America innovations may also be at 
the frontier, but seem still to profit from knowledge spillovers and need to 
combine knowledge held at different locations, as the positive effect on accessing 
knowledge as a motive for collaboration indicates. 
One of the reasons for public funding of collaborative R&D and innovation 
activities between firms and public institutions is to increase the flow of 
knowledge within the national system of innovation. Our results show that public 
funding policy seems to achieve that goal. The public funding variable has a 
strong significant positive effect on the likelihood that a firm co-operates to 
access external knowledge. This means that innovators that receive public 
funding do significantly more often co-operate in order to get access to external 
knowledge, than non funded innovators.  
The technological environment and general firm characteristics have a very 
limited influence on the choice of motives. We obtain only marginally significant 
influences for the export share and demand-side concentration for some motives. 
Our results provide strong evidence for our expectation however, that firms from 
industries that are close to science are more likely to co-operate than firms from 
other industries. Firms from science industries are more likely to co-operate on 
innovation activities to share costs, access external knowledge and to 
commercialize product innovations. Being from a scale intensive industry 
increases the likelihood to collaborate for commercialization motives, which is 
an effect that is not surprising. Firms relying on large scale production should 
naturally be interested in expanding their market(s) in order to realize scale 
economies.  
We also find a robust effect of size on the likelihood to co-operate in order to 
share costs of developing innovations and accessing knowledge. The calculated 
turning points of the U-shaped influence indicate that there is a non-linear 
positive effect on cost-sharing (turning point: 3.13 employees) for all the firms in 
the sample and a non-linear effect on knowledge sharing (turning point: 35 
                                                 
28 See also Schmidt (2005a) who showed that the R&D intensity does only influence absorptive 
capacities for university knowledge. 
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employees). This by and large supports the finding in the literature the larger 
firms are more likely to co-operate than smaller firms. It looks like the reason 
why they are more likely to co-operate is that they want to share the costs of 
developing innovations and access critical complementary knowledge. The 
calculated turning points indicate that accessing knowledge has a negative effect 
on firms with less than 35 employees. One possible explanation for this finding is 
that smaller firms concentrate on their own competencies, capabilities and 
technological expertise and just need less external information to be successful 
with their innovation activities. Small firms do join innovation co-operate in 
order to reduce their costs of developing innovations. Another reason might be 
that small firms are not able to find a partner that is willing to share its 
knowledge and expertise with them, because they lack reputation. They might 
also lack the resources to manage the whole co-operative process and thus opt for 
less informal ways of collaborating and accessing external knowledge and 
expertise than the ones we have measured. 
Results for Individual Collaboration Motives 
So far we have only looked at the results across (all) motives. Our results are 
interesting with respect to single motives as well. For sharing the cost of 
developing innovations we find a negative effect of the share of R&D employees. 
This can be explained by the fact that firms with higher in-house R&D capacities 
are less dependent on (costly) external resources to develop an innovation. Then 
again, they should also be less likely to depend on external sources of knowledge 
and not just external finance. What is more, firms with many internal innovation 
projects (indicated by a high number of R&D employees) should incur high 
innovation costs and be thus more likely to collaborate in order to share costs. 
We obtain a negative sign on the coefficient for the share of R&D employees in 
the knowledge equation, but it is not significant. It also seems to be an influence 
specific to R&D employees, as the share of employees with university degrees, a 
measure of human capital, has a significant positive influence, so does the 
“basicness” of their R&D approach. Other factors that have a significant effect 
on this motive are strategic and formal protection methods, process first 
innovations, size, the export share, and belonging to an industry related to 
science.   
As already mentioned above, the factors that influence the likelihood that firms 
co-operate in order to access knowledge are almost identical to those of the cost-
sharing motive, with the exception of the share of R&D employees and 
employees with university degrees (not significant for m_knowl) and public 
funding (only significant for m_knowl).  
Only for scaling up production processes as a motive for innovation co-
operation significant effects for innovation activities related to post-introduction 
commercialisation of innovations and demand-side concentration can be found. 
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These effects are only significant at the 90%-level, however. The positive 
influence of both variables is puzzling. Post-introduction commercialisation 
activities are defined as “activities undertaken to assure the commercial success 
of your new or significantly improved products” (Statistics Canada, 2005: 6). 
Given this definition the variable should rather increase the likelihood to co-
operate on commercialization, which it does not. The positive effect of a high 
degree of concentration on the demand side on scaling up production processes is 
also hard to explain. Our expectation was a negative effect, because more 
concentrated demand should enable firms to serve its few customers without any 
external partners.  
The last motive we look at is the commercialization motive. Like for the motive 
“scaling up production processes” we find variables with a significant effect that 
is unique for this motive: the dummy variable for resource intensive industries, 
the dummy for scale-intensive industries and obstacles to innovation. The 
negative sign on the obstacles to innovations, which indicates that firms with 
fewer problems with respect to commercialisation of innovations are less likely 
to co-operate for this motive, partially confirms our expectation that firms try to 
overcome obstacles by co-operating. Then again, we do not find an opposite 
influence on the development motives, which would support this statement. The 
industry dummies show that commercialization of innovations is not only 
relevant for firms closely related to science.  
6 Conclusion 
In this paper we show how firms’ characteristics and measures of innovation 
activities influence their innovation co-operation decision with respect to the 
underlying motives. 
Our findings indicate that firms which co-operate in order to share the costs of 
developing innovative products and processes and those that join innovation co-
operation in order to access external knowledge are quite similar. They have 
R&D activities that are relatively more oriented towards basic than applied 
research, are large in size and more often belong to industries related to science. 
They also assign a high importance to strategic and formal protection methods. 
To put it simply, they are more research oriented than other firms. This 
underscores the importance of knowledge for today’s innovation processes.  
The firms that co-operate in order to scale up production and to commercialize 
innovations, respectively, are harder to describe. Both groups have in common, 
that the innovation intensity has a positive effect after a certain threshold is 
reached, while the share of employees with university degrees and the share of 
employees involved in R&D activities does not. The few significant variables 
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may indicate that co-operation for commercialisation and scaling up production 
processes are motives for innovators in general and not just for a specific group. 
It may also indicate that factors other than the ones we included here play a role 
for this type of co-operation motives.  
We find some evidence that public funding increases the flow of knowledge 
within the national system of innovation. Innovators are more likely to co-
operate in order to get access to external R&D and expertise if they receive 
public funding than if they do not receive public funding. Our analysis also 
provides some evidence that the innovation co-operation decision is part of the 
overall innovation strategy of firms.  
While our study is an ex-post evaluation of the relationship between co-
operation motives and the innovation strategy of firms, future studies could 
investigate this link in much more detail. Further research may also look at the 
relationship between co-operation and its motives in areas other than R&D and 
innovation. Another more general topic that could be addressed using Canada’s 
Innovation Survey data is the link between the choice of co-operation partner and 
the underlying motives.  
Future research may profit from co-operation between scholars from business 
administration and economics, with the motive to access each others knowledge. 
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8 Appendix 
Table 4 Construction of the Variables 
Variable  Type Construction 
Act_rdintp Dummy One, if the firm conducted in-house R&D between 2002 
and 2004. 
Act_market Dummy One, if the firm had activities related to the market 
introduction of innovations between 2002 and 2004. 
Act_com Dummy One, if the firm had activities related to post-
introduction commercialization activities for product 
innovations between 2002 and 2004. 
Basic Index Average importance of suppliers, clients, customers, 
competitors, consultants and commercial labs as 
sources of information for innovation divided by the 
average importance of  universities or other higher 
education institutions, colleges or technological 
institutes, federal or provincial/territorial R&D 
laboratories and private non-profit R&D laboratories 
(Reference Period 2002-2004). 
Uni Share Share of a firm’s full-time employees which have a 
university degree in 2004. 
Demand Share Share of total revenue in 2004 that came from the firm’s 
most important customer or client (outside its group). 
Exp_share Share Share of firm’s total revenue from sales of products 
(good or services) to clients outside of Canada in 2004. 
Group Dummy One, if the firm belongs to a group of firms. 
Inno_int Share Share of a firm’s total expenditure that was devoted to 
innovation activities in 2004. Also included as squared 
term (inno_int2). 
Lnemp Log Natural logarithm of the number of employees of a firm 
in 2004. Also included as squared term (lnemp2). 
M_cost Dummy One, if a firm’s motive for co-operation on innovation 
activities between 2002 and 2004 was “sharing the cost 
of developing innovations”. 
M_knowl Dummy One, if a firm’s motive for co-operation on innovation 
activities between 2002 and 2004 was “Accessing 
R&D” and/or “Accessing critical expertise”. 
M_prod Dummy One, if a firm’s motive for co-operation on innovation 
activities between 2002 and 2004 was “Scaling up 
production processes”. 
M_com Dummy One, if a firm’s motive for co-operation on innovation 
activities between 2002 and 2004 was “Accessing new 
markets” and/or “Accessing new distribution channels”. 
Obst_dev Index Sum of importance (between 0 (not used) and 3 (high)) 
of the following obstacles to innovation activities: lack 
of funds within a firm, lack of finance from sources 
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outside a firm, innovation costs too high, lack of 
qualified personnel, lack of information on technology, 
difficulty in finding cooperation partner, inability to 
devote staff to innovation projects and risk related to 
the feasibility of the innovation project. Rescaled 
between 0 (not used) and 1 (highly important). 
(Reference Period 2002-2004) 
Obst_com Index Sum of importance (between 0 (not used) and 3 (high)) 
of the following obstacles to innovation activities: 
market dominated by established firm, uncertain 
demand for innovations, lack of knowledge on markets, 
insufficient marketing effort, inappropriate targeting, 
inappropriate packaging, lack of consumer acceptance, 
lack of standards and regulations. Rescaled between 0 
(not used) and 1 (highly important). (Reference Period 
2002-2004) 
Obst_rel Index Relative importance of obstacles to the development of 
innovations between 2002 and 2004, i.e. obst_dev 
divided by obst_com. 
Pdnov_4 Dummy One, if a firm introduced only product innovations 
between 2002 and 2004 that were either new to their 
province/territory, new to Canada or new to North 
America, but not new to the world.  
Pdnov_5 Dummy One, if a firm introduced product innovations between 
2002 and 2004 that were new to the world 
Pznov_4 – 
Pznov_5 
Dummy Analogous to Pdnov_4 and Pdnov_5  
Prot_strat Index Sum of importance (between 0 (not used) and 3 (high)) 
of strategic protection methods for innovations 
(secrecy, complexity of design, lead-time advantage). 
Rescaled between 0 (not used) and 1 (highly important). 
Reference period 2002 – 2004. 
Prot_form Index Sum of importance (between 0 (not used) and 3 (high)) 
of formal protection methods for innovations (patents, 
trademarks). Rescaled between 0 (not used) and 1 
(highly important). Reference period 2002 – 2004. 
Public Dummy One, if the firm used any of the following programs 
sponsored by the federal or provincial/territorial 
government program for innovation activities between 
2002 and 2004: R&D tax credits, government R&D 
grants, government venture capital support or 
government technological support and assistance 
programs. 
Rdp Share Share of firm’s full-time employees who were involved 
in R&D activities in 2004. 
Dweight Weight Weight of each firm in the sample. 
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Table 5 Construction of the Industry Variables 
Industries   
Resource 
intensive  
Dummy One, if a firm belongs to a resource-intensive industry 
(NAICS 113, 311, 312, 321, 322, 324, 327) 
Labour  
intensive 
Dummy One, if a firm belongs to a labour-intensive industry 
(NAICS 313, 314, 315, 316, 332, 337, 339) 
Scale  
intensive 
Dummy One, if a firm belongs to a scale-intensive industry 
(NAICS 323, 325 excl. 3254, 326, 331, 336 excl. 3364) 
Science Dummy One, if a firm belongs to an industry based on science 
(NAICS 3254, 3341, 3342, 3343, 3344, 3345, 3346, 
3364) 
Specialized Dummy One, if a firm belongs to a specialized industry (NAICS 
333 excl. 3341-3346, 335) 
 
